Water Scarcity and Chinese Economic Development

Jih-Un Kim, Webster University

China’s water scarcity is severe.  Beijing, the capital city of China in the Hai River basin, can provide each resident with less than 300 cubic meters of water (about one-twenty fifth of the world’s average) annually.  The Yellow River, which used to be called the "sorrow of China" for its notorious floods, cannot frequently reach the sea due to less precipitation along the river and its reckless consumption.  Meanwhile, when northern rivers run dry, southern rivers run black.  The rationale of the South-North Water Transfer (nanshui beidiao) project (i.e., delivering clean water from the Yangtze River to parching northern China) is challenged since the river is getting more polluted.  The delta region of the Pearl River, which has nurtured export-oriented industries with its affluent water (13 percent of the national water flow) and has attracted a huge number of migrant workers, is suffering serious contamination owing to industrial wastewater and domestic sewage; the Pearl River Delta, especially Guangzhou and Dongguan, now experiences water shortages with much raw water rendered unsafe or useless by the pollutant discharges. 

The water paucity, exacerbated by pollution, has resulted in economic costs and social disruptions.  A minimum of 15 to 20 million tons of grain production is inflicted by irrigation water shortage annually.  Every year, more than half of China’s 700 cities undergo $15 billion loss in industrial output due to water dearth.   Socially, many Chinese have been threatened by inadequate amount of drinking water and water-borne diseases.  With surface water faltering, underground water has been excessively pumped; reportedly, as aquifer depletes under the land surface, houses and buildings have toppled and roads and reservoirs have buckled or cracked on the surface.  More ominously, violent clashes over water ownership, distribution, and pollution, have been also reported.  Under the circumstances, Chinese leaders and officials including current Premier Wen Jiabao and re-appointed Minister of Water Resources Wang Shucheng admit the existence of water “crisis” and conflicts and recognize their possible consequence of social unrest or disunity of people.  

Nevertheless, tackling with China’s water crisis remains as a daunting task.  For example, China’s long coastline of more than 18,000 kilometers and its corresponding huge seawater area has encouraged the country to pursue seawater desalination as part of five-year plan for almost 25 years, but the current amount of desalinized water (about 10 million tons) accounts for less than 0.002 percent of the total water supply. 

Probably, technological approaches for efficient water consumption are more recommendable.  In most of the countryside, farmers still irrigate their fields simply by flooding water (dashu manguan), wasting a third to half of the irrigation water.  In industry, as of 2002, 537 tons of water is used to turn out 10,000 yuan (about $1,200) value, four times more than the world's average.  Also, the recycling rate of industrial waste water is less than 60 percent, which is 25 percent lower than those of developed countries.    

In the meantime, to curb water squander and pollution, the Center’s institutional efforts should be more rigorously implemented at local levels.  For instance, further increase of water prices is needed when the Chinese get water only for 58 percent of supply cost on average.  However, it should be noted that local governments have arbitrarily levied various different fees on poor farmers in the name of “water fee”: a narrow room for the price increase in rural area has been pre-empted by local corruption.  Also, some local governments have scuttled the Water Withdrawal Permit System by exonerating illegal withdrawals or waiving permit fees.  Concerning water pollution, growth-oriented local officials, who are engrossed in inter-locality competition, keep polluting factories operating.  Particularly, since township and village enterprises (TVEs) are one of few recourses to spur rural economy and absorb surplus agricultural labor, many local governments allow the enterprises to prosper though their water pollution is characterized only with high concentration of pollutants.  It is true that some local governments have wastewater treatment plants and all have environmental agencies.  However, quite a few plants sit idle due to lack of funding (actually lack of concern).  Local environmental bureaus and offices do not rely so much on their higher level agencies as on their local governments for annual budgets, personnel increases, and position advancements; they cannot easily shut down polluting factories while ignoring local governments’ economic concern.  In this context, ironically, China needs a stronger central entity reaching, regulating, and concerting local governments.  Since the late 1970s, China has seen a limited democratic advance in the sense of growing decentralization or political/economic devolution.  However, remember that it has been also a process in which local mercenary parochialism has formed large loopholes of central policies to cope with the water crisis, a critical obstacle to China’s economic development.