Indonesia
Editor, Greg Salisbury

Does the threat of terrorism emerging from Indonesia warrant reengagement
with the Indonesian military?

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No, reengagement would only encourage a military with a record of abuse and
lack of civilian accountability.
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Arguments are made against the need for reengagement on two fronts.   The
first confronts continuing human rights violations committed by the
Indonesian Military (TNI) and the failure to prosecute military brass
involved in such violations.   The other argument addresses the nature of
Islam in Indonesia.

The Indonesia military under Suharto was one of the most brutal forces in
the world.   Since 1998, even several days after the State Department, at
Sec. Condoleezza Rice's behest, reinstated full IMET for Indonesia in
February of this year, the State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights
Practices in Indonesia noted for the year that “security force members
murdered, tortured, raped, beat, and arbitrarily detained civilians and
members of separatist movements, especially in Aceh and to a lesser extent
in Papua.”

International Military Education and Training (IMET) training was first
stalled in 1992 following the Dili Massacre in East Timor when 270 peaceful
protesters were gunned down.  All military support was suspended following
the devastation of East Timor in 1999 by Indonesian sponsored militias when
as 1,500 people where killed, 250,000 displaced, and 70% of the nation's
infrastructure destroyed.  The destruction came on the heels of the UN
sponsored referendum where 89% of the populace voted for independence.

Since then, restoration of funding for IMET has been contingent on the full
cooperation by the Indonesian military of the investigation of murders of
two American citizens and one Indonesian in Papua in August, 2002.  Rights
groups argue that Indonesia has failed to meet the mandated conditions.

In addition, hundreds of human rights violations have been documented in the
troubled Aceh province.

Indonesia: U.S. Underwriting Terrorism?  September 15, 2004
Foreign Policy in Focus, By Conn Hallinan
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0409indonesia.html
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No, fundamentalist Islam in Indonesia is intrinsically different from that
in the Middle East and does not have the same interest to foment political
activity and violence.
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A second perspective examines Islam in Indonesia and the drive towards
"purified" forms of Islam (salafism) and offshoots which side with the use
of violence as tenet of Islam.  A report from the International Crisis Group
describes the distinction between salafis and salafi jihadists, delineating
measures within Islam and Indonesia Islam which tend to buffer individuals
from turning towards violence and political activity.

The report, in essence traces the roots of those involved in the various
bombings in Bali (Jemaah Islamiyah) and Jakarta.  It follows the history of
fundamentalist movements in Indonesia from their beginnings to present day
currents and organizations, and personal rivalries and foreign influence
that drove the perpetrators to commit "terrorist" acts.

Several factors distinguish Indonesian salafis from their violence prone
groups in the Middle East according to the report.  Principally,
fundamentalist Islam in Indonesia eschews political activism, organizing as
it distracts from Islamic practices, allegiance to leaders "central to the
organizational structure of groups like JI", and initiating violence against
targets which may include civilians.

The report concludes that "ironically, the most "radical" of the salafis are
the most immune to jihadist teachings, and the more "moderate", those more
open to other streams of thought, may provide slightly more fertile
recruiting grounds for the jihadis. ...Salafism in Indonesia is not the
security threat sometimes portrayed. It may come across to outsiders as
intolerant or reactionary, but for the most part it is not prone to
terrorism, in part because it is so inwardly focused on faith."

Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix,
September 13, 2004, International Crisis Group

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